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A European “Special Relationship” 
Guiding Principles, Interests and Options for the EU-27 in the Brexit Talks 
Barbara Lippert and Nicolai von Ondarza 
“Brexit means Brexit”, Prime Minister Theresa May promised the British, after a 
majority voted in June to leave the European Union. But at this point, before formal 
exit talks have even begun, the shape of future relations between the EU and the UK 
is still absolutely open. Economic interests on both sides speak for integrating the 
country as fully as possible into the internal market – if London could agree to accept 
its conditions. But the thrust of British politics is driving towards a “hard Brexit”. 
Theresa May categorically rejects partial integration models of the kind enjoyed by 
Norway and Switzerland. In the process of reshaping the relationship, Germany and 
the EU should therefore seek a specific solution for the British: a European “special 
relationship”. This would allow the UK to remain a close partner, but outside the 
internal market and the EU institutions. 
 
Brussels and London are facing years of 
complex negotiations over the UK’s depar-
ture from the Union (see SWP Comments 
35/2016). The legal corridor for the process 
is laid out in Article 50 of the Treaty on 
European Union. Politically too, both sides 
have already put down markers. The EU-27 
insist that talks will not begin until London 
has formally notified the Council of its in-
tention to leave, which Prime Minister May 
has declared she will do no later than the 
end of March 2017. Although the timeframe 
could be prolonged by a court ruling that 
the British parliament must be consulted, 
MPs are not expected to block the process if 
the ruling is upheld by the Supreme Court. 
After notification under Article 50, both 
sides have two years to agree the concrete 
modalities for extracting the UK from the 
EU and its entire legal framework. This in-
cludes all claims and obligations relating to 
the EU budget and the fate of British staff 
working in EU institutions. Not until the 
exit agreement comes into force – or the 
two-year deadline (which can only be exten-
ded by unanimous accord) expires – is the 
UK actually outside the EU and its organs. 
That is likely to occur in spring 2019. 
Reformatting the EU-UK Relationship 
The central political and economic chal-
lenges thrown up by Brexit affect not only 
the arrangements for separation, but also 
the shape of future cooperation between 
the EU-27 and the UK. The central question 
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is the form in which the British will partici-
pate in or enjoy preferential access to the 
internal market. Although the exit agree-
ment is required to take into account the 
framework for future relations, the con-
crete details are completely open and will 
have to be regulated in a subsequent docu-
ment. These talks will take place during a 
period that is already critical for the EU, 
in light of the European poly-crisis, geo-
political developments in the neighbour-
hood and Donald Trump’s election as US 
President. 
In its relations with other European 
states, the EU has to date insisted on an 
absolute distinction between members and 
non-members. While there is no such thing 
as partial membership, partial integration 
is an option, above all in the internal mar-
ket. Two possible models are offered by the 
European Economic Area (EEA, “Norwegian 
model”) and the bilateral treaties between 
the EU and Switzerland, which permit 
preferential market access in individual 
sectors. However, under these models, 
Norway and Switzerland both accept the 
EU’s rules (including freedom of move-
ment) and the rulings of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ); they also contribute 
to the EU budget. Turkey enjoys a customs 
union with the EU, which covers most of 
the goods traded between them and in-
cludes a common external tariff. Despite 
this partial integration, the states in ques-
tion continue to be treated as non-members 
of the EU. They have no representation 
or voting rights in EU organs, and play no 
part in creating EU secondary legislation – 
even in cases where they are obliged to 
implement it. 
Any of these models would allow the 
British to pursue a “soft Brexit”. But they 
would also require significant concessions 
on national sovereignty. The looming 
alternative is the threat of a “hard Brexit”, 
where not only most of the political, but 
also the economic ties would be cut. 
The Interests of the EU-27 
Directly after the referendum, the heads of 
state and government of the EU-27 agreed 
that there will be “no negotiations before 
notification”. This put the ball in London’s 
court as far as talks about leaving and 
creating a new relationship are concerned. 
The British government and parliament 
will use the time between now and late 
March 2017 to define the interests it wishes 
to prioritise in the coming talks. The EU 
should define its own interests equally 
dispassionately and thoroughly. 
The interests of the EU-27 are shaped by 
three principal factors. Firstly, the EU states 
have an undeniable economic interest in 
maintaining regulated access to the British 
market. In 2015 about 10 percent of intra-
EU trade went to the UK (value €302 bil-
lion). But the economic significance of 
trade with the UK varies between member 
states. The UK is one of the top five trading 
partners for Germany, France and Poland, 
for example (about 7 percent of exports in 
each case), for Ireland it is the most impor-
tant (about 14 percent). The UK is a less 
central trading partner for many Central 
and Eastern European countries, such as 
Hungary, Austria and the Baltic states, and 
for Greece. In intra-EU trade, the UK has the 
second-largest trade deficit, after France. 
It originates entirely in visible trade; in 
services the UK has a trade surplus with the 
rest of the EU, above all on account of 
financial services. While Brexit will always 
involve additional economic restrictions, 
preserving free movement of goods would 
serve the central economic interests of the 
EU-27. The UK, on the other hand, stands 
more to lose from relinquishing its privi-
leged access to free movement of capital 
and services than its European partners. 
Secondly, the EU has an interest in 
guarding the Union’s cohesion. The un-
certain future of transatlantic relations 
following the US presidential election 
makes European unity even more crucial. 
Brussels will therefore insist that full 
participation in the internal market can 
only be granted if the EU’s legislation and 
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regulations are implemented in full and its 
court rulings accepted. At their first infor-
mal meeting in June 2016, the twenty-seven 
heads of state and government reiterated 
their insistence that the four freedoms of 
the internal market are indivisible. Indeed, 
Switzerland and all the EEA states (like 
Norway) also are required to implement EU 
legislation in those areas where they par-
ticipate in the internal market. Within the 
EU, too, flexibilisation on customs union 
and internal market is excluded. For the 
heart of internal market is not just exemp-
tion from customs duties, but collective 
regulation of the market and reciprocal 
recognition of standards and norms. This is 
what makes it possible to minimise non-
tariff trade barriers. Simply in order to safe-
guard the functioning of the much more 
important intra-EU market, the Union has 
no option but to insist that participation 
in the internal market means accepting 
its rules. 
Additionally, like monetary union, the 
internal market is not governed by a purely 
economic rationale. Instead it is set up as 
an integration project, based on a political 
balancing of the preferences and interests 
of the participating states. This includes 
mechanisms by which the more powerful 
economies compensate the benefits they 
derive from the internal market through 
EU-funded spending for the weaker mem-
bers. The EU therefore demands that third 
states like Norway and Switzerland accept 
these package solutions and make their 
own contributions, for example through 
cohesion payments. On account of their 
participation in the internal market, these 
countries are also bound to permit freedom 
of movement for economically active per-
sons. In purely economic terms, the inter-
nal market would also function with 
restricted freedom of movement, as evi-
denced by the long transition periods 
imposed on workers from new member 
states. So making participation in the 
internal market conditional on freedom 
of movement and contributions to the EU 
budget represents an important precondi-
tion for protecting the EU’s cohesion, 
rather than a punishment for the UK. 
Thirdly, specific national interests will 
play a role in the talks with London. The 
Republic of Ireland, in particular, is con-
cerned to keep its border with Northern 
Ireland as open as possible. Although free-
dom of movement between Ireland and 
the UK is regulated in a separate bilateral 
agreement, the openness of the shared 
border is heavily affected by EU member-
ship. If the UK leaves the customs union 
with the EU, for example, customs controls 
would have to be introduced. And any 
hardening of the border would endanger 
the Northern Ireland peace process. Spain 
in turn demands at least shared sovereignty 
over Gibraltar if the UK leaves the internal 
market; otherwise, Madrid threatens to 
close its border with the British enclave. 
The EU states with most citizens living in 
the UK will want to protect their rights. 
In the negotiations, these particular inter-
ests will have to be reconciled with the 
overall interests of the EU-27. 
The EU-27’s existing position for the 
Brexit talks can be summarised as follows: 
British participation in the internal market 
is desirable and possible, but only under 
EEA conditions. That means acceptance of 
all four freedoms (including freedom of 
movement), contributions to the EU bud-
get, and implementation of EU rules (in-
cluding interpretation of internal market 
law, which in the EEA context means the 
ECJ and the EFTA Court). Notably, all 
twenty-seven member states are in com-
plete agreement on these points. 
London Wants the Hard Brexit 
Political developments in the UK since the 
Brexit referendum, however, show that 
any kind of partial integration that would 
effectively turn the UK into a satellite of the 
EU is out of the question. This is despite the 
UK having more to lose than the EU from 
ending privileged access to the internal 
market. The EU-27 is by far the most impor-
tant trading partner for the UK, with about 
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47 percent of goods exports (August 2016); 
even its trade with Ireland remains larger 
than with China. But since her defining 
speech to the Conservative Party conference 
in October 2016, Prime Minister May has 
repeatedly excluded the possibility of any 
kind of cooperation based on existing 
partial integration models. 
In connection with the talks, May has 
drawn three red lines. After leaving, the UK 
will neither accept full freedom of move-
ment nor implement EU legislation, and 
will not be bound by rulings of the ECJ. 
May’s government interprets the referen-
dum above all as a vote against freedom of 
movement and loss of national sovereignty. 
The British Conservatives would not accept 
these aspects of the EU – which they regard 
as negative – surviving Brexit, even in ex-
change for participation in the internal 
market. 
The Labour Party has also publicly com-
mitted to accepting the outcome of the 
referendum – especially with 70 percent of 
Labour MPs representing seats that voted 
“leave”. The Scottish regional government, 
on the other hand, is pressing for access to 
the internal market. But it possesses no for-
mal veto right and has seen Prime Minis-
ter’s cold shoulder. Even with the parlia-
mentary participation required by the Brit-
ish courts, Britain is heading for a hard 
Brexit. 
Building Blocks for a European 
Special Relationship 
Although the UK and the EU-27 derive great 
economic benefit from the common mar-
ket, political interests on both sides thus 
largely exclude partial integration – unless 
one side decided to decisively subjugate its 
political interests for the sake of economic 
gain. This cannot be entirely excluded, for 
example if the economic costs of Brexit rise 
significantly before the talks are completed, 
or pressure is exercised by the British par-
liament. But a hard Brexit must be the base-
line scenario for Germany and the EU-27. 
This makes it even more crucial from the 
European perspective to define principles 
and mechanisms to enable cooperation 
with the British without integration into 
the internal market. The issue in question 
is a special relationship between the EU 
and the UK. The European interests out-
lined above suggest four elements. 
1. Change of status: from member to 
third country 
Brexit means a change of status from mem-
ber to third country, requiring a different 
perspective on the whole relationship. 
When the UK leaves, this will be the first 
time that the EU has to establish compre-
hensive relations (“close partners”) with 
an ex-member, which for its part will be 
seeking to cut many of its ties with the 
Union. In principle the process of severing 
links should be regulated in the exit 
agreement. 
As described above, London rejects any 
option that involves replicating the con-
ditions of the internal market. So the 
question will be not which of the benefits 
of EU membership can be preserved (mem-
bership minus), but which (trade) relations 
the EU wishes to maintain with the UK over 
and above simple trade in goods (free trade 
plus x). The EU should therefore treat 
talks over future cooperation with the UK 
primarily as trade talks. 
2. Preserving free movement of goods 
In these trade talks the EU should seek at 
least a basic free trade agreement (FTA), in 
order to ensure tariff-free movement of 
goods. Potentially, if the negotiations went 
well, the corresponding provisions could 
follow on seamlessly from the transitional 
arrangements of the exit agreement. This 
would create legal security for European 
companies and safeguard a vital export 
market – especially for German businesses. 
In view of the tight timeframe for the 
Article 50 talks, such a basic FTA should 
initially be configured purely as a duty-free 
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arrangement. This would place it far below 
the level of the EU’s recent deep and com-
prehensive agreements like CETA, which 
aim primarily to abolish non-tariff trade 
barriers. As such it should be possible to 
conclude it within the two-year deadline, 
in parallel to the exit agreement. One 
relevant consideration is that a basic FTA 
could be ratified at EU-level, without 
involving the member states. 
Such an agreement would also be clearly 
distinct from partial integration into the 
internal market, even in visible trade. For 
example there would be no common exter-
nal tariff, no free movement of services and 
no “passporting” permitting firms based 
and regulated in the UK to sell financial 
services throughout the EEA. Nor would a 
basic FTA contain harmonisation measures 
or reciprocal recognition of norms and 
standards, which work to minimise the 
non-tariff trade barriers that play a much 
larger role today. 
Initially at least, trade barriers created by 
differences in regulations will be minimal 
anyway. London has already announced 
that there will be a “Great Repeal Bill” to 
ensure legal security. Despite its name, as 
well as ending the applicability of Euro-
pean law within the UK, the proposed bill 
would also adopt the EU’s entire acquis into 
British law with effect from the leave date. 
This will initially ensure close regulatory 
congruence. But each subsequent legal act 
and court ruling in the EU and the UK 
will widen the regulatory gap. In order to 
enforce European standards after Brexit, 
it may therefore make sense for the EU-27 
to gradually augment the basic FTA with 
elements pointing towards a deeper and 
more comprehensive trade agreement. The 
EU should also prepare itself for any kind of 
targeted undercutting of EU standards by 
the UK to enhance its competitiveness, 
including in taxation. 
As its preference for an EEA-type solution 
indicates, the EU is interested in an evolu-
tionary clause to open a route for expand-
ing relations beyond free trade. But London 
will attempt to secure access to the EU ser-
vices market by the back door, without 
shouldering the associated political and 
financial costs. What London most wants to 
avoid is concessions on sovereignty and 
freedom of movement. 
The UK’s primary interest is passporting 
rights for financial services. These presently 
permit banks and insurance companies 
operating in the UK – most notably the City 
of London – to offer their services across the 
EU, while operating under British regula-
tions. Despite her statements on a hard 
Brexit, Theresa May has already promised 
international firms that their access to 
the EU market will be preserved. Here the 
EU-27 needs to preserve its existing con-
sensus that full access to the internal mar-
ket is contingent on all four freedoms. This 
should continue to apply if the basic FTA 
is gradually expanded. 
3. Multidimensional cooperation 
Beyond the basic FTA, the EU has an inter-
est in comprehensive cooperation with the 
future non-member; the form and level of 
commitment are initially open. Fundamen-
tally the entire spectrum of existing EU 
policy fields, including foreign and security 
policy, needs to be reviewed to ascertain in 
how far and in which form cooperation 
with the third country UK should be orga-
nised. Donald Trump’s election as US 
President will force Europe to adopt more 
responsibility for its own defence, and 
heightens the EU’s interest in cooperating 
closely with the UK on internal and exter-
nal security. The EU’s broad range of forms 
of cooperation with other third states sup-
plies a good illustration of the possibilities 
for bilateral cooperation. 
In justice and home affairs Brussels and 
London will continue to share an interest 
in working together to tackle transnational 
challenges. Theresa May has already said 
that she intends to continue to work with 
the EU on policing, above all the fight 
against terrorism and organised crime. 
Here the British – despite their opt-outs – 
have long played a leading role in the EU. 
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Even after the Brexit vote, the UK has made 
use of its opt-in rights to continue its 
voluntary participation in Europol and the 
Eurodac database. Complete isolation from 
police and judicial cooperation in the EU 
would hit the British themselves hard, but 
also tear a hole in international crime-
fighting. 
Through Europol the EU and the United 
States have concluded an operational agree-
ment on exchanging data for fighting 
terrorism and organised crime. In the case 
of Norway cooperation is even deeper. In 
justice and home affairs, the EU has numer-
ous agreements with Oslo supplementing 
the EEA, ranging from data exchange to 
cooperation with Europol’s Cybercrime 
Centre. Following Norway’s example of 
joining Schengen is out of the question for 
the UK; not even for the forms of coopera-
tion it provides, for example in EU asylum 
policy and the European border and coast 
guard Frontex. Even as a member of the EU, 
the UK rejected Schengen membership. 
The association agreement with Ukraine 
represents a middle path for collaboration 
with Brussels, with cooperation on border 
protection and counter-terrorism joining 
the long-term goal of visa-free travel. The 
principle in all three cases is that the 
respective countries are not involved in 
the EU’s decision-making processes, but 
enhanced cooperation is enabled through 
bilateral agreements. 
Parallels to this are found in the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP). As a NATO member with a perma-
nent seat on the UN Security Council, the 
UK will remain an important partner for 
most EU states in this field. If it wished, the 
UK could contribute considerable military 
capacities and a wide-ranging diplomatic 
network. The UK also maintains close 
bilateral and multilateral relations with 
certain EU states, such as France and the 
Netherlands. 
The EU has always kept NATO member 
Norway closely integrated into its defence 
policy, above and beyond the EEA. Norway 
has a cooperation agreement with the Euro-
pean Defence Agency (EDA), and partici-
pates in an EU battlegroup as well as in EU 
military and civilian operations. Oslo also 
regularly supports joint EU positions at the 
United Nations and has joined EU sanctions 
against Iran, Syria and Russia. But Norway 
is excluded from the decision-making 
processes and consultation bodies of the 
CFSP/CSDP. Cooperation with NATO mem-
ber Turkey is considerably less extensive 
because of the Cyprus conflict, but Ankara 
has also participated in EU military opera-
tions. In a similar fashion, the association 
agreement with Ukraine provides for poli-
tical dialogue on foreign and security 
policy, as well as cooperation with the EDA 
and participation in EU exercises and oper-
ations. EDA cooperation is already active 
and there is political dialogue, but not to 
full extent envisioned in the agreement, on 
account of the ongoing Ukraine conflict. 
There are, however, two significant 
reservations concerning future European-
British cooperation on foreign and security 
policy. Firstly there is a question of how far 
London would even be willing to partici-
pate in the CFSP/CSDP. Even as a member of 
the EU, the UK was always very reserved in 
this context, sometimes even obstructive, 
for example with respect to a joint head-
quarters or the EDA budget. Secondly, as a 
non-member of the EU the UK would not 
have a say in CFSP/CSDP decisions; instead 
there would have to be bilateral dialogue 
between Brussels and London. 
4. Institutional framework 
for cooperation 
Even in the event of a hard Brexit the EU 
should build an institutional framework 
that enables it to discuss with London on 
a regular basis. This applies above all to 
cooperation in non-economic fields. In 
association agreements the EU has already 
created sometimes elaborate institutional 
means for dialogue with third states. The 
association article of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union re-
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quires that such agreements define shared 
procedures and specific processes, as well 
as reciprocal rights and responsibilities. In 
practice this means regular meetings at 
senior official, ministerial or even summit 
level to discuss the state of relations and 
progress made. To this end there is usually 
also an ongoing dialogue between MEPs 
and the respective national parliaments. 
The setting often reflects the partner coun-
tries’ strong desire for dynamic relations 
and ever closer association. As a rule repre-
sentatives of the EU – Council President, 
Commission President or High Representa-
tive – meet directly with the third state; 
consultations between third states and the 
representatives of all EU members tend to 
be the exception. 
The EU will face particular challenges in 
seeking to institutionalise its relations with 
the UK. Firstly, all forms of partial integra-
tion – and not just the hard Brexit – ex-
clude British participation in EU decision-
making processes. Leaving aside the poli-
tical imperative to preserve the Union’s 
cohesion. In the context of the founding 
of the EEA the ECJ explicitly ruled that 
decision-making and enforcement systems 
located outside the EU must not be binding 
on the EU organs. Secondly, even a basic 
FTA may require a basic institutional frame-
work with working groups, a cooperation 
committee at senior official level and a 
ministerial cooperation council. But this 
rather technical cooperation would not be 
adequate for developing relations in non-
economic fields. For example in the field of 
security a new institutional arrangement 
could be developed for cooperation on 
internal and external security.  
All in all, the specific solution for the UK 
is likely to lie somewhere between the EU’s 
loosely institutionalised relations with the 
United States and its over-institutionalised 
arrangements with Russia. Both versions 
involve summits. Like Washington and Mos-
cow, London can also be expected to test 
whether it can divide the EU-27 through 
strong bilateral relationships (for example 
London-Berlin, London-Paris etc.). 
There are various options for an appro-
priate institutional arrangement. Either 
the EU pursues a bundling of treaties and 
agreements – which could end up being as 
confusing as the package of more than 120 
bilateral agreements with Switzerland. Or 
Brussels seeks a framework agreement, 
eventually building on the FTA, and embeds 
this further. It would also be conceivable to 
create a joint organisation with its own 
organs, modelled on the EEA. But that 
would presuppose shared interests in sub-
stantive areas. In all this it must be remem-
bered that the EU is a community of law 
that requires a dependable framework 
for properly regulated relationships, and 
cannot be directed primarily by British 
pragmatism. 
After the Divorce – a Special 
Relationship 
Negotiating the UK’s departure and future 
relations will be an extremely complex 
operation even for the EU, both legally and 
politically. In the light of the three red lines 
London has already drawn, the EU’s answer 
can only be to seek partnership rather than 
partial integration. In view of the shared 
interests and geographical proximity, this 
should be a special partnership, a European 
special relationship. In the two years of 
leave talks it will only be possible to build 
the base of this partnership, which should 
have four cornerstones: (1) the UK will be 
a third country outside the internal mar-
ket, with (2) trade in goods is governed by 
a basic FTA; (3) arrangements for coopera-
tion in external and internal security and 
(4) institutionalised forums for regular 
exchange. 
Both the exit agreement and the special 
relationship will be new territory for the 
Union. So the talks are likely to be strongly 
characterised by insecurity, speculation 
and perhaps also experiments. Mitigating 
harm will not suffice as the EU’s objective. 
At the same time the EU side is unlikely to 
find it easy to maintain a thoroughly con-
sistent and unified negotiating stance 
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towards the UK. Strong conflicts of goals 
can already be seen emerging – between 
market interests and freedom of move-
ment, between hard Brexit on economic 
questions and cooperation in foreign and 
security policy, and between the national 
interests of individual member states. 
It is therefore central for the Brexit nego-
tiators to communicate quickly and clearly 
which procedures are being applied and 
which goals the EU and its member states 
are pursuing. A European special relation-
ship is a realisable project that also gives 
the EU space to pursue its internal reforms. 
This is necessary if the EU is to assert its 
foreign policy and security interests in a 
world in geopolitical turmoil. Despite 
Brexit the Union has the chance to renew 
itself as a political and economic power-
house of the West. 
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